INTRODUCTION
The jacket photo for John T. McGreevy's Catholicism and American Freedom1 is striking. In the foreground, a young and vigorous Pope John Paul II, censer in hand,2 strides across an altar platform on the Mall in Washington, D.C. His attention is fixed off camera, presumably at the altar he is about to reverence with incense. At the bottom of the picture, gathered around and below the platform, sits a grainy group of mitre-wearing bishops.3 Looming directly over the scene, in the background yet dominating the photograph, is the towering dome of the U.S. Capitol Building.
This picture is worth many thousand words; it evokes and captures many of the events described, themes developed, and debates presented in this excellent book. The crowd of faceless bishops, lurking beneath the foundations of the Capitol, recalls the famous Thomas Nast cartoon depicting a mass of crawling crocodile-like prelates who, with toothy, gaping mitres, stalk Tammany-abandoned schoolchildren cowering in the ruins of the public schools and armed only with the Holy Bible.4 That the Church's rituals are proceeding in [Vol. 102:1191 our most public of public squares, in the shadow of the unmistakably churchlike seat of our national government, reminds us that our "separation of church and state" has long been anything but strict, and perhaps also that even our professedly secular state has at times demanded faithlike loyalty to its own political orthodoxies.5 That the Capitol dome so resembles that of St. Paul's Cathedral in London highlights the tension between Catholicism and America's Protestant origins, traditions, and premises. In the picture, the Pope occupies an in-between place, as Catholics in America often have: he appears both suspended and intent on mediating between the ancient, hierarchical Church he leads and the modern, democratic nation he is addressing. His posture is neither defensive nor defiant, but confident. It is as if his aim is not to impose a conclusion, but to propose a claim and to initiate a conversation.
Catholicism and American Freedom is about, and part of, that conversation. This book is relevant and important reading for anyone who aspires to understand American culture, history, and politics. It should also be of particular interest to lawyers and legal scholars. And, the book is welcome, given the appallingly widespread ignorance of the themes and topics it explores.6 I.
John T. McGreevy is the author of Parish Boundaries:
The Catholic Encounter With Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North, a respected history.7 His latest book, Catholicism and American Freedom, confirms McGreevy's skill and sensitivity. It is timely, engaging, provocative, and entertaining. It is carefully researched and annotated, but never pedantic or tedious. McGreevy's prose is clear and accessible; his tone is warm and charitable, balanced but not [Vol. 102:1191 culture, law, or politics.14 And, he concludes not with a strident call to ideological arms, or a bullet-point litany of policy recommendations, but with the cautious, modest suggestion that we temper our "romantic view of individual autonomy" with a corrective appreciation for associations, communion, and solidarity (p. 295).
McGreevy's subject, in a nutshell, is the story of how "America" -or, more particularly, American liberalism15 -has reacted and responded to Catholic claims about the nature and purpose of "freedom," and how these claims were, in tum, shaped by Catholicism's interactions with, internal conversations about, and adjustments to American liberalism. This "interplay between Catholic and American ideals of freedom" -a dynamic that "remains poorly understood" -is the book's unifying storyline (p. 14). Thus, the challenge for McGreevy is "to capture two traditions in motion, not one: to explore American ideas about Catholicism along with the predispositions (at times blinders) framing the mental landscape of American Catholics" (p. 15). This book -like John Courtney Murray's, more than forty years earlier -considers Americans' efforts to work through the questions "whether Catholicism is compatible with American democracy" and "whether American democracy is compatible with Catholicism." 16 Throughout the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, it was regularly charged and widely believed by American intellectuals and leaders that there was something un-American about Catholicism's clergy, claims, teachings, practices, structures, traditions, and adherents.17 For many people and for many years, the Roman 15. "Liberalism" is, I realize, "a term so protean that it risks becoming useless." Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 306 n. 4 (1990) . For present purposes, the term describes "a family of political ideas and practices that emphasize the importance of individual freedom and of preserving space for personal autonomy free from collective control." Id. 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION ix-x (1960).
17. This book's title is a play on Paul Blanshard's now-infamous but once-best-selling work, American Freedom and Catholic Power, a sustained warning about the threat posed by Catholicism to American ideals and values. PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949) .
There is some reason to think that Blanshard's arguments may be returning to respectability, at least in some quarters. See ("Catholic participation in the American consensus has been full and free ... because the contents of this consensus ... approve themselves to the Catholic intelligence and conscience .... The ideas expressed are native to his own universe of discourse. ").
[Vol. 102:1191
One particularly effective feature of McGreevy's guided tour through the Catholic-American dialogue is the way he frames his story around particular, noteworthy participants. Take, for example, the muscular anti-liberalism of the nineteenth century's simultaneously self-confident and reactionary Catholic revival: McGreevy explores it through the exploits and arguments of the charismatic and confrontational Jesuit, Fr. Bernadine Wiget, who worked in Boston's North End and was a refugee from the anticlericalism then sweeping across Europe. Similarly, the arc of Orestes Brownson's dauntingly prolific career tracks the efforts of mid-century Catholics in America who opposed slavery and secession, but also perceived liberal revolution, nationalism, and individualism as threats to authentic human freedom. Brownson was determined to resist the common assumption of liberals and Catholic revivalists that Catholics opposed the American experiment. 24 His work helps McGreevy to explore the "tricornered dynamic" of "liberal intellectuals and politicians convinced of Catholicism's hostility to freedom and progress, ultramontane Catholics determined to resist liberalism's insistence on individual autonomy in all spheres, and a loose assemblage of liberal Catholics tacking between the two groups" (p. 67).25
Fr. John Ryan, a Catholic University professor, brought Catholic thinking on solidarity and human dignity to bear on twentieth-century labor and economic questions, but also scorned the "selfishness" of contraception. He embodies in McGreevy's study both the rapp rochement between Catholic and liberal social reformers who embraced economic planning, trade unionism, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the divisions to come on matters of sexual morality and abortion (p. 158). John Courtney Murray's work illustrates the efforts of Catholic intellectuals in the middle-twentieth century "to move Catholic theology and philosophy toward a more nuanced understanding of the challenges posed by modernity" (p. 191), to retrieve a Catholic account of democracy and human rights, and to articulate a robust, Catholic understanding of religious freedom that avoided the errors of both nineteenth-century popes and strict separationist Supreme Court justices.
Catholicism and American Freedom is not a work of legal theory or an analysis of legal doctrine, but it has a lot to say about law and to 24. Brownson urged Catholic immigrants to avoid sectarian self-ghettoization, to become "nationalized as well as naturalized, and [to] merge themselves in the great American people. " P. 45. And, he expressed "frustration at being pinned between an 'anti Catholic sentiment ... shared ... by the majority of our countrymen' and coreligionists creating the impression that a Catholic must make 'himself a foreigner in the land of his birth.' " P. 47 Whall's parish priest -the above-mentioned Fr. Wigetchallenged local Catholic boys to follow Thomas's example in resisting "infidelity and heresy," shamed from the altar those who did not (p. 8), and publicly criticized the more conciliatory stance of his American-born fellow priests (p. 42). The pillars of the Boston establishment were outraged by Whall's impudence, warning that "[i]f Protestant Christianity is to be abandoned in our public educational system, we shall convert the schools of the Puritans into heathen temples" (p. 9). They rallied to the "general and common doctrines of Christianity" as a necessary defense to a "Romanism" that "allies 35. P. 10. This was the inscription on a goblet sent to Thomas Whall -along with other tributes from "admiring Catholics across the country" -by the Catholic community in Covington, Kentucky. Id. itself with every false and anti-republican institution which is yet tolerated in our glorious country" (pp. 9, 11). Likewise, the trial court in Whall's father's (unsuccessful) excessive-force lawsuit concluded that the refusal to participate in the recitation from the Protestant Bible threatened the good order and "stability of the public school," "the granite foundation on which our republican form of government rests."36 Thomas Whall's beating was not "the last gasp[] of the Reformation"; rather, the "Eliot School Rebellion" was a "Boston variant on a nineteenth-century struggle shaping religion and politics" around the world {p. 12). By the same token, Fr. Wiget's belligerence was not the idiosyncratic response of one truculent priest, but was instead of a piece with a broader, "ultramontane"37 Catholic "revival."38 To be sure, anti-Catholicism in America was nothing new, and went well beyond the legal penalties imposed upon, and disabilities endured by, Catholics in the American colonies and states.39 From the Puritans to the Framers and beyond, anti-"popery" was thick in the cultural air breathed by the early Americans, who were raised on tales of Ar�nadas and Inquisitions, Puritan heroism and Bloody Mary, Jesuit schemes and Gunpowder Plots, lecherous confessors and baby-killing nuns.40 Thomas Paine's diagnosis would 36. P. 8 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001) ("Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing to read from the Protestant Bible, and crowds ... rioted over whether Catholic children could be released from the classroom during Bible reading.") (citation omitted).
37. "Ultramontane," or "beyond the mountains," in this context denotes support for papal supremacy in the Roman Catholic Church, and is usually contrasted with "Gallican," which refers to a nineteenth-century movement in the Church favoring national autonomy and restrictions on papal power. Cf pp. 12-13 (noting that "ultramontane" is "shorthand for a cluster of shifts that included a Vatican-fostered move to Thomistic philosophy, a more intense experiential piety ... an international outlook suspicious of national variations with Catholicism, and a heightened respect for church authorities .... "); p. 26 (describing "Gallicanism" as "the notion that national customs might trump Roman regulations").
38. The nineteenth century Catholic "revival" was "philosophical, theological, and organizational"; it included an emphasis on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, on more pietistic forms of devotion, on "Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an increasingly secular, even hostile, world." P. 25. In every American colony . . . specific test laws or the possibility of being challenged to subscribe to a test or oath of abjuration, with refusal leading to prosecution as a 'popish recusant,' ensured the exclusion of Catholics from public life. Even more than these statutes, a pervasive opinion that 'Popery' was synonymous with tyranny relegated Catholics to a position beyond the realm of acceptability. have enjoyed broad support when he lamented that those in the "popish world at this day by not knowing the full manifestation of spiritual freedom, enj oy but a shadow of political liberty."4 1
In the mid-nineteenth century, as waves of immigration and the muscular claims of the Catholic revival collided with America's nascent nationalism, long-running theological disputes became political and cultural arguments. Liberal Protestants warned that Jesuit refugees and other newcomers from Europe were "indefatigable enemies of democracy and enlightenment" (p. 23) and that Catholicism "retarded" "human progress and freedom" (p. 33), while Catholics emphasized the dangers of an excessive and "destructive individualism" and proposed a more "communal vision of church, state, and society" (p. 26). McGreevy's exploration of the "interplay between Catholic and American ideas of freedom" (p. 14) begins with this collision, and then follows the course of the resulting relationship through a century-and-a-half of American history.
For starters, he situates the Common School Movement in the context of this clash between the anti-liberal understanding of freedom embraced in the Catholic "revival," on the one hand, and the anti-clericalism and nationalism of the mid-century revolutions, on the other.42 The perceived excesses of these revolutions had caused many Catholic intellectuals to "define[] themselves against dominant ideas of freedom" and "individual autonomy" (p. 13), and to emphasize "Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an increasingly secular, even hostile, world" (p. 25). And so, as "American liberals relied upon schools to produce citizens worthy of a democratic republic,"43 Catholics insisted that "the work of education [was] a principally religious work,"44 with ultramontanes like Fr.
for more than two centuries before it took political form with the Native American outburst of the 1840's and the Know-Nothingism of the 1850's."). (l]arge masses of foreign populations are among us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, unless they become citizens in fact as well as in name. In no other way can the process of assimilation be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the public schools .... 16 (1994) (writing that the education of children should "be considered a genuine apostolate" and that an educator is "a person who 'begets' in a spiritual sense").
P. 11 (quoting Thomas
Wiget warning that the common-school system "was the most complete and most ingenious system that could be devised for perverting Catholic youth."45
McGreevy turns next to slavery, abolitionism, and the Civil War, focusing on the intra-Catholic debates about these matters,46 and also on Catholics' more general concerns about liberal individualism and the centralization of state power. He is therefore able to provide a new and nuanced discussion of the antebellum role and stance of Catholics, north and south. In particular, McGreevy reveals how "[u]neasiness about liberal individualism proved as powerful in shaping Catholic views on slavery as in affecting the conflict over education. "47 Like every other religious denomination and social group, Catholics were divided on the questions of secession, union, and abolition. Thus, Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati could pronounce that "Christian people disregard [Christ's] precepts and principles and example, when they seek to uphold or perpetuate involuntary human servitude" (p. 83; footnote omitted), while his episcopal colleague across the Ohio River, Bishop Martin Spalding of Louisville, was no less adamant that Republicans and abolitionists were possessed of a " 'satanic' hatred of Catholicism" that "would soon turn against the church" (p. 87; footnote omitted). Even Catholics who loathed slavery worried about aligning themselves with an abolitionist movement that often "threw Catholicism and slavery together in a completely unjust manner" (p. 78; footnote omitted), and were "sympathetic to the charge that the nationalism of the Lincoln administration bordered on dictatorship" (p. 73; footnote omitted).
As if to confirm liberal Catholics' antebellum worries, President Grant warned in a famous 1875 speech to Union Army veterans that:
[I]f we are to have another contest in the near future of our national existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon's 47. P. 49. The Catholic view on slavery and abolition "certainly included racism, but did not wholly depend upon it." Pp. 54-55. Many Catholics "lumped immediate slave emancipation with a religious and political radicalism that threatened the foundations of society." P. 56. Thus, McGreevy contends, Catholic objections to abolitionism, such as there were, "cannot be reduced to the particular American racial dynamic .... This acceptance [of slavery] rested upon the pervasive fear of liberal individualism and social disorder that so shaped Catholic thought during the nineteenth century, along with the anti-Catholicism of many abolitionists." P. 52.
[Vol. 102:1191 but between patriotism and intelligence on one side, and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other. 48 Everyone knew what the President was talking about, and Grant's fears tracked broader adjustments in American anti-Catholic polemics. Increasingly, the nature, ambitions, and errors of Catholicism were seen as political, as well as theological; they threatened not only the conscience liberated by Luther, but also the Nation unified by Lincoln (p. 96). The vice of Catholicism was not simply religious heresy, but dissonance with "national organic unity".49
These concerns about unity and Catholics' objections to "the pretensions of the modern nation-state" "collided with extraordinary force in the discussion of public education."50 In part because of recent cases like Mitchell v. Helms, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, and Locke v. Davey,51 the "school wars" of the late nineteenth century are better and more widely understood than they once were. McGreevy advances the debate by placing controversies about the Blaine Amendments, parochial-school funding, etc., against the backdrop of the broader liberal-Catholic conflict, showing that "[t]he desire for a state monopoly on education escalated in tandem with nineteenth century nationalism throughout Europe, with schools increasingly understood as the crucible of citizen formation" (p. 112).
From tension and conflict, McGreevy turns to convergence and agreement, on policy if not on fundamental premises. With the "surge in labor unrest," the "intensely communal and international vision fostered by nineteenth-century ultramontane Catholics became more appealing to a new generation of non-Catholic intellectuals and reformers struggling to understand a society racked by poverty and labor unrest" (p. 126). True, in many quarters, anti-Catholicism as a social or cultural phenomenon remained as strong as ever (pp. 124-25). Nonetheless, the Church-as-implacable-foe-of-modernity served even for many of its liberal critics as a useful bulwark against socialism (p. 123). On the Catholic side, the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, Rerum novarum -today regarded as the fountainhead of Catholic social teaching5 2 _,.. confirmed Catholics' more communal vision of society without embracing radical attacks on private property. To be sure, the encyclical was more than a baptism of progressive assumptions about the state, economy, and society. It framed the reformers' questions, and the moral significance of their ends, in a specifically Catholic vocabulary, emphasizing the primacy of the family, the importance of mediating associations, and so on. In any event, it appeared, in the early decades of the twentieth century, that Catholics and Americans -progressive, liberal, right-thinking Americans -could agree on any number of ends. The "high point" for this new "Catholic-Liberal alliance" came with the publication and reception in 1931 of Pope Pius Xi's Quadregesimo anno, which emphasized the "social character" of ownership and was hailed by President Roosevelt as "one of the greatest documents of modern times. "53
Still, even as Catholics and liberals agreed "that the classical liberal economic vision of a minimal state and an open economic playing field had proved unworkable," it was clear that they "worked from starkly different philosophical premises" (p. 138). While Catholic thinking had been energized by Pope Leo XIII's call for a renewed emphasis on the moral and epistemological realism of St. Thomas Aquinas, liberals had turned instead to skepticism, pragmatism, and empiricism.54 Moreover, a "cluster of issues" -social and moral issues, newly ascendant -"signaled conflict" (p. 153), given that Catholics' reservations about atomistic individualism pushed them toward the economic reforms championed by Roosevelt, but also toward an increasingly solitary conservatism on such matters as divorce, censorship, and contraception. Reactions to the presidential campaign of Al Smith and Klan-sponsored attacks on Catholic schools [Vol. 102:1191 confirmed the hardiness of fears about Catholics' Americanness.55 As liberals' fears turned in the 1930s from socialism to fascism, Catholic sympathy for Italy and Spain caused many Americans to ask again, "Is there a Catholic problem?"56
The answer, for many prominent mid-century liberal intellectuals, was "yes."57 Accordingly, McGreevy explores the foundations and implications of Paul Blanshard's claim -advanced sensationally in his bestseller, American Freedom and Catholic Power -that "the Catholic problem is still with us," and required "resistance" to "counter the antidemocratic social policies of the hierarchy."58 While not "a cautious monograph," Blanshard's book "correctly assessed the intellectual mood" (p.
As McGreevy shows, the debate was as much about "America" as it was about Catholicism.59 True, tens of thousands of Catholic soldiers had proved their "loyalty" to America during the Second World War, but to observe that "Catholics would remain loyal citizens was to miss the point. Democracy was a culture, not a set of propositions. Catholics obviously lived among Americans, but were they of them?" (p. 169). In The New Republic's words:
[T]he real conflict is not between a Church and State or between Catholicism and Americanism, but between a culture which is based on absolutism and encourages obedience, uniformity and intellectual subservience, and a culture which encourages curiosity, hypothesis, ex perimentation, verification by facts and a consciousness of the processes of individual and social life as opposed to conclusions about it.6() Thus, Catholicism was again pressed into service in a "strategic, antithetical role" for intellectuals eager to "demonstrate the non hierarchical sources of American culture. "6 1
McGreevy situates the Supreme Court's landmark Everson and McCollum decisions, and the parochial-schools debate more generally, in the context of these concems.62 Although leading liberals had hailed the Court's defense of non-state education in Pierce v. Society of Sisters as an "immediate service on behalf of the essential spirit of liberalism,"63 by mid-century many had come to regard that case as a "dangerous inroad" on "the nation's stake in having a common democratic education for all its children."64 Catholic schools, it was charged, "shielded young Catholics from the democratic way of life,"65 while the public schools were celebrated by Justice Frankfurter in the McCollum case as "the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."66 At an even deeper level, the parochial-schools and church-state-separation debates were not only about American democracy, but also about the nature of religion itself. Religion in a democracy, it was often argued, is and must be a private matter, a product of individual choice, and the end of an "individual quest."67 That Catholicism appeared unable, or unwilling, to offer an account of religion and religious liberty that was consonant with democracy and individualism made it all the more suspect.
61. P. 175. Increasingly, it was not only the politics and structure of the Catholic Church, but also its moral teachings on such matters as divorce and re-marriage, that were criticized as anti-democratic. "Democracy is a penetrating principle," one writer insisted, "extending into the most intimate relations of life .... Obviously, the Catholic procedure in mixed marriages inhibits this spiritual freedom." P. John Courtney Murray, Jacques Maritain, and other like-minded thinkers worked to deflect and respond to these suspicions. The task taken on by these mid-century Catholic intellectuals was to "bind Catholic social thought to democracy, human rights, and religious freedom" in a manner consistent with notions of authentic doctrinal development,68 and to "allay doubts as to whether 'the Catholic Church can adapt herself vitally, on principle, and not merely on grounds of expediency, to what is valid in American democratic development.' "69 These efforts appeared to bear fruit, with Pope Pius XII observing, during the Second World War, that "the democratic form of government" now appeared "as a postulate of nature imposed by reason itself";70 with the Church's promiscuous post-war embrace of the language of human rights;7 1 and with the endorsement at the Second Vatican Council of Murray's human-dignity-based defense of religious freedom.72 Even Paul Blanshard had to concede that Catholicism "could no longer be described as a monolithic glacier of reactionary thought. "73 And so, "fears among American intellectuals about Catholic power diminished" (p. 208). As during the tum-of-the-century reform movements, liberalism and Catholicism seemed to act in common cause. Catholic leaders were in the "vanguard" of the fight for racial equality and civil rights (p. contraception," and the developing clash in the abortion-rights context between liberals' increasingly "radical defense of individual autonomy" and Catholics' "determin[ation] to protect human life," pointed toward continued conflict. 75 McGreevy covers in some detail both the debates within the Catholic Church about contraception and abortion and, more generally, the political, legal, and social developments involving these issues. Two themes receive special emphasis. First, the Catholic position on these and other controversial matters came to be regarded not only as incorrect and out-of-date, but also as out of place in public discourse.76 Many Catholics at mid-century were convinced that Catholic moral realism and the Church's unbending insistence on the "absolute inviolability of the right of an innocent human person to life"77 had been validated and vindicated by the Second World War, Nazi atrocities, and abuses at home of euthanasia and sterilization.78 Nevertheless, as the Catholic Church seemed increasingly to be standing alone on questions of sexual and reproductive morality,79 it became possible for those advocating liberalization to complain that the "religious beliefs of some should not be forced upon all. "80 Supreme Court Justices warned of "sectarian religious propagandists" and the "hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena."8 1 John Rawls's "suspicion of religious arguments became legal orthodoxy" {p. 263), and Professor Tribe asserted that Catholic opposition to abortion represented "efforts to legislate 'religious faith upon which people will invariably differ widely. ' "82 Second, this discussion places in stark relief the central tension around which the book is organized, namely, the divide between Catholic and liberal understandings of human freedom: "The Catholic understanding of the human person clashed with this new liberal emphasis on autonomy, as well as with the idea that theological arguments were unacceptable in public debate."83 For many liberals, influenced perhaps by an increasingly popular European existential ism, "[t]he substantive outcome of any particular decision ... mattered less than protecting the autonomy of the decision-making agent" (p. Now, it is a truism -but true nonetheless -that what's past is prologue. And so, these final, "current events" pages are valuable not so much because they tell us anything new about the state of play in abortion politics, the clergy-sex-abuse scandals, or intra-Catholic squabbles, but rather because they confirm and illustrate several recurring themes in Americans' conversations about Catholicism, democracy, and freedom. They remind us that, although Catholicism and American Freedom is billed as "a history," its subject is a relationship between "two traditions [still] in motion" (p. 15). By highlighting the salient flashpoints of that relationship over the past century-and-a-half, McGreevy helps scholars and engaged citizens to understand its current state and difficulties.
For example: the recent revelations about sexual abuse by Catholic clergy, and the shocking failure of Catholic leaders and bishops to respond candidly and charitably to it, have prompted appropriate and understandable outrage, and also demands for safeguards and reform.86 No reasonable observer, even if educated about and sensitive to the past and present reality of anti-Catholicism in American culture, could blame the Church's current crisis simply on the hostility or prejudices of the press. And yet, it is hard to deny that, although the Church's gross failures prompted much sound and measured criticism, they also gave new life to, and were frequently evaluated in light of, "venerable anti-Catholic tropes" about authority, hierarchy, celibacy, and sexuality (p. 290). When a perhaps overwrought Attorney General of Massachusetts emphasized that the state " 'must' play a central role in dictating internal governance reforms that the church 'must' adopt,"87 and even presumed to instruct the Church concerning the selection, training, and ordination of its priests, those familiar with McGreevy's story must have been reminded of that State's earlier experiments with nunnery inspections (p. 62), if not the investiture crises of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.88 McGreevy's work gently but firmly confronts these "tropes," and underscores the long-standing liberal temptations to exploit myths about Catholic clergy and to counter through intrusive regulation and supervision the Church's perceived political and cultural influence. This book should therefore be of great value to lawyers, legislators, and scholars working to respond to priests' crimes and bishops' failures in a manner consistent with religious freedom. 89 Similarly, McGreevy's discussion of the early twentieth-century liberal-Catholic alliance on the "social question" and economic reform is helpful in assessing present-day discussions about capital punishment. The evolution during the last few years of America's death-penalty debate90 -for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia91, or Governor Ryan's wholescale grant of clemency to those on death row in lllinois92 -has included the Catholic Church's highly visible re-examination of capital punishment. McGreevy discusses, for example, the efforts of Cardinal Joseph Bernardin and others to articulate a comprehensive "pro-life" ethic, one in which issues such as abortion, euthanasia, violence, and the death penalty are linked in a seamless garment (pp. 285-87). And, prominent Catholics from Sr. Helen Prejean to Pope John Paul II have become some of the world's leading voices against the death penalty,93 a fact that is probably curious to those who are conditioned to regard the Catholic Church as "conservative."
Recall, though, McGreevy's observation that agreement and concert on the rights of labor, and shared criticisms of laissez fa ire capitalism, obscured the fact that Catholic and liberal reformers often worked from radically different premises (pp. 138, 153-54): that is, the work and writings of Fr. Ryan and Pope Leo XIII proceeded not from statist collectivism, ideological hostility to private property, or an uncritical embrace of individual autonomy; but rather from distinctly Catholic claims about work, the family, and the structure of civil society. Similarly, it is worth remembering today that the Catholic Church's opposition to capital punishment is built not on moral relativism or skepticism about the reality of evil and of human agency, but on fundamental claims about the implications for punishment of our status as creatures made in the image and likeness of God. 94 And, of course, it is hardly possible to avoid the continuity, across more than 150 years, in our arguments about education, religion, citizenship, and democracy. If the animating aspiration of the Common School movement and its progeny was the "produc [tion] [of] citizens worthy of a democratic republic" (p. 38), leading political theorists today likewise insist that education must be structured and regulated in a way that renders "liberal citizens ... capable of their great office."95 No participant in the contemporary school-choice arena can help but hear the echoes of earlier liberals' worries about the destabilizing and anti-democratic effects of Catholicism and Catholic education. If common-school partisans once saw their mission as one of liberating children and the Republic's future from the prejudices and superstitions of Catholicism, some call today for increased regulation of private and religious education in the name of children's autonomy96 and the liberal state's commitment to "conscious social reproduction."9 7 Again, the dynamics and debates that McGreevy identifies and explores seem helpful, even essential, to a well-developed understanding of school vouchers and education reform, of First Amendment problems involving the "Blaine Amendments" and "pervasively sectarian" schools,9 8 and of "civic education" and political liberalism more generally.99 99. There is a rich scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges posed by religious faith, teachings, and communities to certain conceptions of political liberalism.
In addition to these and many other instructive links between McGreevy's narrative and contemporary questions of policy, several of the book's themes resonate with provocative developments and arguments in constitutional law and political theory. For example, as many scholars have observed (or complained), at the heart of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's legacy is a version of "federalism" that emphasizes the connections between the protection and vitality of individual freedoms and the Constitution's structural features. These structural features both preserve and clear out the "space" of civil society in which associations and mediating institutions do their work of creating norms, forming citizens, and protecting freedom. As Professor McGinnis has explored in great detail, a powerful and pervasive theme in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a recognition, and even a celebration, of the place in civic life of mediating associations, their expression, and their diversity.100 It is worth reflecting, then, on the fact that many of the differences that McGreevy identifies and describes between Catholic and liberal understandings of "freedom" stem from different understandings of the relation between individual freedom and autonomy, on the one hand, and the freedom and autonomy of groups and mediating institutions, on the other. The claim that, perhaps more than any other, animates McGreevy's account is that the Catholic view was and remains less individualistic, and more communal or communitarian, than the liberal one.101 It should be emphasized, though, that Catholic social teaching is not reducible to the amorphous "communitarianism" that is fashionable in many circles, to statist collectivism, or even to centralization generally. thought is not simply that it emphasizes "community" rather than individual "autonomy," but why it emphasizes community. Accordingly, the principle of "subsidiarity" serves as a bulwark against both excessive individualism and stultifying centralization. "Subsidiarity," in a nutshell, is the "principle of limited government" according to which "[t]he state should do only what cannot effectively be done by private action, and whenever possible the individual should make his own decisions."103 Like American federalism, the principle recognizes the connection between associational freedoms and the authentic freedom and flourishing of persons.104 However, its end is not devolution for its own sake, any more than the Catholic critique of individualism that McGreevy traces supports centralization for its own sake. 105 The Catholic notion of subsidiarity, like Catholics' assertedly more "communal" orientation, aims ultimately not at the good of the state, or at the greatest good for the greatest number, but at the "common good" of persons, i.e., at achieving "those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way."106 Thus, the different ideas of "freedom" running through McGreevy's account are not reducible to the claim that "liberals talk about the individual, while Catholics talk about community." Yes, as McGreevy describes, "Catholics talk about community," but this is because of its asserted connection to human "freedom." After all, the authentic freedom of (Vol. 102:1191 persons is no less fundamental to Catholic thinking than it has been to the liberal tradition. 107 McGreevy performs a valuable service in pushing us to realize that the Catholic tradition in America has not so much opposed freedom as proposed a different kind of freedom, oras Professor Rodes puts it, "a deeper understanding of freedom." 108 Also running through both of these traditions is an argument about Catholics' loy alty. The "Catholic problem," in the imagination of American liberals, has often been conceived in terms of loyalty to democracy, to nation, and -more recently -to autonomy-based morality. 109 My colleague, Professor Michael Baxter, along with theologian Stanley Hauerwas, has argued that the American set of "political arrangements" "present[s] a deep and intractable challenge" for "that community whose allegiance is first and foremost to the Kingship of Christ."116 It is widely supposed, Baxter and Hauerwas observe, that a "central purpose" of those arrangements "is the subordination of religion to the political order, meaning the primacy of democracy."11 7 Thus, "in their embrace of the American experiment, Catholics have learned to adapt to a political landscape marked by religious indifferentism . "11 8 In Baxter's view, the appropriate, authentic response to doubts about Catholics' loyalty is not irenicism, but irresolution.119 Certainly, this is a controversial position, and it is not obviously a weakness in McGreevy's book that he fails to endorse it. The point here is simply that our public conversations about law, religion, citizenship, and loyalty would be improved if their [Vol. 102:1191 participants acquired a greater sensitivity to the matter of religious believers' competing loyalties.12°
Finally, as was just mentioned, running through this book is a claim that Catholic morality and political theory are more communitarian than individualistic, solidaristic than atomistic, and so on. This is a claim, however, that goes deeper than claims about how societies, governments, and economies should be organized. Even more important is the fact that Catholicism proposes a moral anthropology that is at odds with the one proposed by liberalism, and that this deeper difference is at the heart of the dynamic explored in this book. For a recent example of anthropological reflection in the service of jurisprudential argument, consider a recent article by Professor Steven Smith, in which he "addresses how our conception of what it means to be a person influences First Amendment law."126 In his view, our law generally, and our First Amendment doctrine in particular, have "suffered by embracing conceptions of the person ill-advisedly imported from other disciplines or philosophical perspectives" and would "be strengthened and enriched by a more self-conscious recognition of ... 'the person as believer.' "127 What is more, Smith contends, a law of religious freedom -or, more generally, a theory of political community -that proceeded from a "believer" -based anthropology would contrast markedly, and in important ways, from one that rested, say, on Rawlsian political liberalism, which encourages, and even requires, the radical privatization of religion. 128 Smith's argument is important and provocative, and this is not the place for a detailed account or response. It is enough here to suggest that the kinds of examinations and reflections proposed and undertaken by Smith are promising, and that McGreevy's history should assist them by showing how one particular set of arguments and experiences across time has been shaped not simply by different notions of "freedom," but also by different views of who and what we really are who struggle for it.
CONCLUSION
The word "religion" comes from religare, which means to "tie fast" or bind together.1 2 9 And yet, many today appear to regard religion's purported capacity -even tendency -to "divide" as its near defining feature.130 True, few epithets in contemporary discourse are as biting, yet as tedious and vacuous, as the charge that a person, claim, argument, proposal, or belief is "divisive.'' The term -like "controversial" and "partisan" -often seems to do little more than signal the speaker's disapproval, and her desire that the offending target either be quiet, or change her tune. Nevertheless, American society is, we are told time and again, fractured, split, partisan; it is, about many things and in many ways, "divided." We are, Gertrude [Vol. 102:1191 Himmelfarb contends, "One Nation, two cultures."131 What is more, it is difficult to avoid the impression that social and political fault lines trace, even if they do not clearly result from, religious differences and disagreements. " [T] here is," several researchers have concluded, "a new religious order in American electoral politics, one characterized not only by the distinctive partisanship of religious traditions, but also by theological polarization within the nation's three largest tradi tions."132 These divisions should not be overstated, but they are real. 133 Catholicism and American Freedom opens and closes with divisions, both in the American political community and in the Roman Catholic Church.134 Certainly, McGreevy does not celebrate these divisions. Nevertheless, one of this book's many lessons might be that, in the end, we should "cherish only modest expectations with regard to the solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity."135 At the same time, this work offers the attractive, unifying hope that as the "long Catholic encounter with American ideas of freedom" continues, all will come to appreciate "that associations and ties with the strangers in our midst satisfy our deepest, most common aspirations" (p. 295).
